C and C++ persist as popular programming languages thanks to the flexibility and performance they provide to developers. However, these benefits come at the costs that software written in C/C++ are often prone to exploitable memory-corruption vulnerabilities which allow adversaries to take control of the vulnerable applications. Despite the recent advances in fuzzing, to uncover these vulnerabilities, and defenses to mitigate this class of vulnerabilities, the problem is far from being solved.
In this talk we provide an in-depth overview over different state-of-the-art sandboxing techniques, their underlying principles and challenges.
Information Security Engineer
Christopher is currently working as an information security engineer at Google. Before, he worked at Qualcomm’s product security team and received his PhD, which focused on memory-corruption attacks and defenses, from Technische Universität Darmstadt.
Christopher is currently working as an information security engineer at Google. Before, he worked at Qualcomm’s product security team and received his PhD, which focused on memory-corruption attacks and defenses, from Technische Universität Darmstadt.
DSC Munich Lead
DSC Munich Core team
DSC Munich Core team
DSC Munich Core team
DSC Munich Core Team
DSC Munich Core team
DSC Munich Core Team
DSC Munich Core team
